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Three Essays on Labor and 
Credit Markets 
Benjamin J. Keys
Changes in the credit market over the last 30 years have 
expanded access and transformed the way in which house-
holds apply for, use, and abuse credit opportunities. Yet the 
ramifi cations of this democratization of credit have been 
underexplored within the economics literature. This dis-
sertation investigates three dimensions of the impact that 
the credit market has on the labor market, and vice versa. In 
doing so, this research develops improved frameworks for 
understanding the relationship between labor market choices 
made concurrently with borrowing decisions, as well as 
provides empirical evidence for these two markets’ interde-
pendence. The essays in this dissertation provide insight into 
the interaction between personal bankruptcy and the labor 
market, the incentive structure for the issuance of subprime 
mortgages, and the decision making behind borrowing 
interest-free student loans.
The Credit Market Consequences of 
Job Displacement
More than one million households fi le for bankruptcy 
each year. The system is designed to help households that are 
unable to repay their debts regain control of their fi nances. 
By limiting the risk associated with borrowing, however, 
bankruptcy laws create an incentive for individuals to 
increase their debt. This tension between the desire to give 
households a “fresh start” and the moral hazard therein has 
been a central point of confl ict in the politics of bankruptcy 
reform and in the present academic research on bankruptcy. 
On the one hand, two-thirds of bankruptcy fi lers cite the 
loss of a job or other source of income as the main reasons 
for fi ling (Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1999). These 
fi ndings form the basis for the claim that unanticipated “trig-
ger events” such as job loss, divorce, or health crises cause 
bankruptcy. On the other hand, some researchers counter that 
“strategic” behavior drives the decision to fi le for bank-
ruptcy, as households continue to borrow and wait until the 
benefi t from fi ling is at a maximum before discharging their 
debts. In their infl uential paper, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) 
analyze fi ling patterns in the PSID and argue that “discharge 
of debt is the dominant consideration in households’ deci-
sions to fi le” (p. 716).
The fi rst paper shows that these two perspectives, rather 
than being mutually exclusive, are both essential to un-
derstanding the personal bankruptcy decision. I develop a 
dynamic, forward-looking model of household behavior 
where the relationship between income shocks and the deci-
sion to fi le for bankruptcy is explicit. The model implies that 
strategic agents respond to adverse events optimally, both in 
their borrowing patterns and in the likelihood and timing of 
bankruptcy. Intuitively, the decision to fi le for bankruptcy is 
irreversible and costly, and as such, there is an option value 
to delaying (White 1998). Unanticipated shocks lead to asset 
positions where fi ling is fi nancially benefi cial, while expec-
tations about future earnings play an important role in both 
the decision to fi le and the timing of when to fi le. The model 
provides two key predictions: 1) the bankruptcy decision 
crucially depends on both the magnitude and the expected 
persistence of the income shock, and 2) job separations and 
other income shocks can lead to lagged responses of bank-
ruptcy fi ling.
I test these predictions using individual-level data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and 
county aggregate data collected from the U.S. Courts. The 
effect of job loss on bankruptcy is estimated in the NLSY 
using an event-study framework that carefully controls for 
the timing of income shocks. Unlike previous research on 
bankruptcy, the event-study methodology explicitly ad-
dresses the source of exogenous variation and allows for 
estimation of preshock differences in bankruptcy likelihoods. 
Using this approach, I fi nd that households are four times as 
likely to fi le for bankruptcy in the year immediately follow-
ing a job displacement. Bankruptcy risk then declines in 
magnitude but persists for two to three years. The persistence 
of a higher bankruptcy risk after displacement is consistent 
with the model, which formalizes the option value to delay-
ing fi ling.
To explore further the implications of the model and to 
test additional hypotheses raised by the “adverse events” 
empirical literature, I investigate the impact of divorce 
and health crises on the household bankruptcy decision. 
In contrast to previous research, I fi nd that divorce is not a 
proximate cause of bankruptcy, as the likelihood of fi ling for 
bankruptcy rises prior to divorce. I also fi nd that the timing 
of health shocks are highly related to the timing of bankrupt-
cy. Overall, the evidence suggests that plausibly exogenous 
job displacement and negative health shocks can play a role 
in predicting future bankruptcies among those at-risk.
Although the NLSY is the best available panel data to 
study bankruptcy, its small sample size does not yield the 
statistical power necessary to distinguish the effects of job 
loss based on the severity of the displacement or the demo-
graphics of the displaced. To examine these issues, I use 
county-level data from the last three decades to estimate the 
aggregate relationship between bankruptcy and job loss. This 
independent analysis, using different data and a different em-
pirical specifi cation, yields similar results. I fi nd that 1,000 
additional job losses are associated with 8–11 bankruptcies, 
and that the effects of job loss persist for two to three years, 
consistent with the model and corroborating the individual-
level results using the NLSY.
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To examine the model’s prediction that more perma-
nent income shocks are more likely to lead to bankruptcy, I 
separate the county-level job losses into manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing jobs. Manufacturing jobs are generally 
associated with longer tenure relationships and greater fi rm-
specifi c human capital (Anderson and Meyer 1994; Topel 
1990). Furthermore, losing a manufacturing job often leads 
to deeper and more persistent earnings shortfalls (Carrington 
1993). Consistent with the model’s predictions, I fi nd that the 
loss of a manufacturing job is three times more likely to lead 
to bankruptcy than the loss of a nonmanufacturing job. This 
is the fi rst empirical evidence that the structural shift away 
from the manufacturing sector has contributed to increases 
in bankruptcy, and confi rms that the micro foundations of the 
dynamic model are supported by the macro patterns in the 
data.
Separating the effects by county demographics and 
macroeconomic conditions provides greater insight into 
the consequences of job loss. I fi nd that job losses are more 
likely to lead to bankruptcies in counties that are more edu-
cated, wealthier, and have a larger fraction of working-age 
individuals. These results suggest that job loss may be more 
painful in these types of counties, with losses anticipated 
to be more permanent, or representing greater destruction 
of tenure and fi rm-specifi c human capital. Similarly, during 
high-unemployment periods when unemployment durations 
are expected to be signifi cantly longer, the loss of 1,000 
job leads to 40 more bankruptcies, while during low-unem-
ployment periods the relationship is small and statistically 
insignifi cant. These results provide robustness to the main 
fi ndings and offer an explanation for the cyclical patterns of 
bankruptcy observed in the aggregate data.
These two complementary empirical analyses at the micro 
and aggregate levels contribute to the literature on job loss 
by providing strong evidence that the consequences of dis-
placement extend into the credit market. In a similar context, 
Sullivan (2008) fi nds that households increase their unse-
cured borrowing via credit cards in response to a short-term 
earnings shock. Though unemployment spells are usually 
brief, these short-term shocks can have larger long-term 
consequences on a worker’s well-being. Recent research has 
documented decreased long-term earnings and consumption, 
greater marital discord, and even heightened mortality result-
ing from job losses (Browning and Crossley 2008; Charles 
and Stephens 2004; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993; 
Stephens 2001; Sullivan and von Wachter 2007).
The costs of bankruptcy are steep for the bankruptcy 
courts, which review more than one million cases per year, 
for all borrowers, who pay higher interest rates to compen-
sate for the cost of discharged debts, and for the households 
in jeopardy of default. Timely intervention on the part of 
policymakers or the private sector potentially could reduce 
the costs of bankruptcy. In 2005, a new provision to per-
sonal bankruptcy law was enacted that requires all debtors 
to undergo credit counseling prior to fi ling for a discharge 
of their debts. However, this feature of the new bankruptcy 
code has not been successful in deterring fi lings, as clients 
receive counseling only after contacting a bankruptcy lawyer. 
A recent GAO report (GAO-07-203), appropriately titled 
“Value of Credit Counseling Requirement Is Not Clear,” 
supports the view that counseling would be more effective if 
individuals with severe credit risks were identifi ed at an ear-
lier date: “Anecdotal evidence suggests that by the time most 
consumers receive the pre-fi ling counseling, their fi nancial 
situations are dire, leaving them with no viable alternative to 
bankruptcy.” Because the likelihood of fi ling for bankruptcy 
is heightened in the years following a layoff, providing 
credit counseling at the time of job displacement, or when an 
individual exhausts Unemployment Insurance benefi ts, might 
help some households avoid bankruptcy. It is not clear what 
form a successful intervention would take, whether it would 
require targeted extensions of credit, greater repayment fl ex-
ibility, or forcing households to declare bankruptcy sooner 
and thus avoid accumulating additional unsecured debt. 
Designing feasible policy initiatives based on these results is 
an important direction for future research.
Does Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?
Securitization, converting illiquid assets into liquid 
securities, has grown tremendously in recent years, with the 
securitized universe of mortgage loans reaching $3.6 trillion 
in 2006. The option to sell loans to investors has transformed 
the traditional role of fi nancial intermediaries in the mort-
gage market from buying and holding to buying and selling. 
The perceived benefi ts of this fi nancial innovation, such as 
improving risk sharing and reducing banks’ cost of capi-
tal, are widely cited (see, for example, Pennacchi [1988]). 
However, delinquencies in the heavily securitized subprime 
housing market increased by 50 percent from 2005 to 2007, 
forcing many mortgage lenders out of business and setting 
off a wave of fi nancial crises that spread worldwide. In light 
of the central role of the subprime mortgage market in the 
current crisis, critiques of the securitization process have 
gained increased prominence.
The rationale for concern over the originate-to-distribute 
model during the crisis derives from theories of fi nancial 
intermediation. Delegating monitoring to a single lender 
avoids the problems of duplication, coordination failure, 
and free-rider problems associated with multiple lenders 
(Diamond 1984). However, in order for a lender to screen 
and monitor, it must be given appropriate incentives (Holm-
strom and Tirole 1997), and this is provided by the illiquid 
loans on their balance sheet (Diamond and Rajan 2003). By 
creating distance between a loan’s originator and the bearer 
of the loan’s default risk, securitization may have potentially 
reduced lenders’ incentives to carefully screen and monitor 
borrowers (Petersen and Rajan 2002). On the other hand, 
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proponents of securitization argue reputation concerns, regu-
latory oversight, or suffi cient balance sheet risk may have 
prevented moral hazard on the part of lenders. What were the 
effects of existing securitization practices on screening? This 
remains an empirical question.
The second paper, co-authored with Tanmoy Mukherjee, 
Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig, investigates the relationship be-
tween securitization and screening standards in the context of 
subprime mortgage loans. The challenge in making a causal 
claim is the diffi culty in isolating differences in loan out-
comes independent of contract and borrower characteristics. 
First, in any cross-section of loans, those that are securitized 
may differ on observable and unobservable risk character-
istics from loans kept on the balance sheet (not securitized). 
Second, in a time-series framework, simply documenting a 
correlation between securitization rates and defaults may be 
insuffi cient. This inference relies on establishing the optimal 
level of defaults at any given point in time. Moreover, this 
approach ignores macroeconomic factors and policy initia-
tives that may be independent of lax screening and yet may 
induce compositional differences in mortgage borrowers 
over time. For instance, house price appreciation and the 
changing role of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
in the subprime market may also have accelerated the trend 
toward originating mortgages to riskier borrowers in ex-
change for higher payments.
We overcome these challenges by exploiting a specifi c 
rule of thumb in the lending market, which induces ex-
ogenous variation in the ease of securitization of a loan 
compared to a loan with similar characteristics. This rule of 
thumb is based on the summary measure of borrower credit 
quality known as the Fair Isaac Company (FICO) score. 
Since the mid-1990s, the FICO score has become the credit 
indicator most widely used by lenders, rating agencies, and 
investors. Underwriting guidelines established by the GSEs, 
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, standardized purchases of 
lenders’ mortgage loans. These guidelines cautioned against 
lending to risky borrowers, the most prominent rule of thumb 
being not lending to borrowers with FICO scores below 620 
(Avery et al. 1996; ). While the GSEs actively securitized 
loans when the nascent subprime market was relatively 
small, since 2000 this role has shifted entirely to investment 
banks and hedge funds (the nonagency sector). We argue 
that persistent adherence to this ad-hoc cutoff by investors 
who purchase securitized pools from nonagencies generates 
a differential increase in the ease of securitization for loans. 
That is, loans made to borrowers that fall just above the 620 
credit cutoff have a higher unconditional likelihood of being 
securitized and are therefore more liquid relative to loans 
below this cutoff.
To evaluate the effect of securitization on screening deci-
sions, we examine the performance of loans originated by 
lenders around this threshold. As an example of our design, 
consider two borrowers—one with a FICO score of 621 
(620+), the other with a score of 619 (620-)—who approach 
the lender for a loan. In order to evaluate the quality of 
the loan applicant, screening involves collecting both hard 
information, such as the credit score, and soft information, 
such as a measure of future income stability of the borrower. 
Hard information, by defi nition, is something that is easy to 
contract upon (and transmit), while the lender has to exert an 
unobservable effort to collect soft information (Stein 2002). 
We argue that the lender has a weaker incentive to base 
origination decisions on both hard and soft information at 
620+ where there is a higher likelihood that this loan will be 
eventually securitized. In other words, because investors pur-
chase securitized loans based on hard information, the cost 
of collecting soft information is internalized by lenders to a 
lesser extent when screening borrowers at 620+ than at 620-. 
Therefore, by comparing the portfolio of loans on either side 
of the credit score threshold, we can assess whether differ-
ential access to securitization led to changes in the behavior 
of lenders who offered these loans to consumers with nearly 
identical risk profi les.
Using a sample of more than one million home purchase 
loans during the period 2001–2006, we empirically confi rm 
that the number of loans securitized varies systematically 
around the 620 FICO cutoff. For loans with a potential for 
signifi cant soft information—low documentation loans—we 
fi nd that there are more than twice as many loans securitized 
above the credit threshold at 620+ vs. below the threshold at 
620-. Since the FICO score distribution in the population is 
smooth (constructed from a logistic function), the underlying 
creditworthiness and demand for mortgage loans (at a given 
price) is the same for prospective buyers with a credit score 
of either 620- or 620+. Therefore, these differences in the 
number of loans confi rm that the unconditional probability 
of securitization is higher above the FICO threshold, i.e., it is 
easier to securitize 620+ loans.
Strikingly, we fi nd that while 620+ loans should be of 
slightly better credit quality than those at 620-, low docu-
mentation loans that are originated above the credit threshold 
tend to default within two years of origination at a rate 10–25 
percent higher than the mean default rate of 5 percent (which 
amounts to roughly a 0.5–1 percent increase in delinquen-
cies). As this result is conditional on observable loan and 
borrower characteristics, the only remaining difference 
between the loans around the threshold is the increased ease 
of securitization. Therefore, the greater default probability of 
loans above the credit threshold must be due to a reduction in 
screening by lenders.
Since our results are conditional on securitization, we 
conduct additional analyses to address selection on the part 
of borrowers, lenders, or investors as explanations for the 
differences in the performance of loans around the credit 
threshold. First, we rule out borrower selection on observ-
ables, as the loan terms and borrower characteristics are 
smooth through the FICO score threshold. Next, selection 
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of loans by investors is mitigated because the decisions of 
investors (Special Purpose Vehicles, SPVs) are based on 
the same (smooth through the threshold) loan and borrower 
variables as in our data (Kornfeld 2007).
Finally, strategic adverse selection on the part of lend-
ers may also be a concern. However, lenders offer the entire 
pool of loans to investors, and, conditional on observables, 
SPVs largely follow a randomized selection rule to create 
bundles of loans out of these pools, suggesting securitized 
loans would look similar to those that remain on the bal-
ance sheet (Gorton and Souleles 2005). Furthermore, if at all 
present, this selection will tend to be more severe below the 
threshold, thereby biasing the results against us fi nding any 
screening effect. We also constrain our analysis to a subset of 
lenders who are not susceptible to strategic securitization of 
loans. The results for these lenders are qualitatively similar 
to the fi ndings using the full sample, highlighting that screen-
ing is the driving force behind our results.
Could the 620 threshold be set by lenders as an optimal 
cutoff for screening that is unrelated to differential securiti-
zation? We investigate further using a natural experiment in 
the passage and subsequent repeal of antipredatory laws in 
New Jersey (2002) and Georgia (2003) that varied the ease 
of securitization around the threshold. If lenders use 620 as 
an optimal cutoff for screening unrelated to securitization, 
we expect the passage of these laws to have no effect on the 
differential screening standards around the threshold. How-
ever, if these laws affected the differential ease of securitiza-
tion around the threshold, our hypothesis would predict an 
impact on the screening standards. Our results confi rm that 
the discontinuity in the number of loans around the threshold 
diminished during a period of strict enforcement of anti-
predatory lending laws. In addition, there was a rapid return 
of a discontinuity after the law was revoked. Importantly, our 
performance results follow the same pattern, i.e., screening 
differentials attenuated only during the period of enforce-
ment. Taken together, this evidence suggests that our results 
are indeed related to differential securitization at the credit 
threshold and that lenders did not follow the rule of thumb in 
all instances. Importantly, the natural experiment also sug-
gests that prime-infl uenced selection is not at play.
Once we have confi rmed that lenders are screening more 
rigorously at 620- than 620+, we assess whether borrowers 
were aware of the differential screening around the threshold. 
Although there is no difference in contract terms around the 
cutoff, borrowers may have an incentive to manipulate their 
credit scores in order to take advantage of differential screen-
ing around the threshold (consistent with our central claim). 
Aside from outright fraud, it is diffi cult to strategically 
manipulate one’s FICO score in a targeted manner, and any 
actions to improve one’s score take relatively long periods of 
time—about three to six months. Nonetheless, we investi-
gate further using the same natural experiment evaluating 
the performance effects over a relatively short time horizon. 
The results reveal a rapid return of a discontinuity in loan 
performance around the 620 threshold, which suggests that 
rather than manipulation, our results are largely driven by 
differential screening on the part of lenders.
As a test of the role of soft information on screening 
incentives of lenders, we investigate the full documentation 
loan lending market. These loans have potentially signifi cant 
hard information because complete background information 
about the borrower’s ability to repay is provided. In this mar-
ket, we identify another credit cutoff, a FICO score of 600, 
based on the advice of the three credit repositories. We fi nd 
that twice as many full documentation loans are securitized 
above the credit threshold at 600+ vs. below the threshold at 
600-. Interestingly, however, we fi nd no signifi cant differ-
ence in default rates of full documentation loans originated 
around this credit threshold. This result suggests that despite 
a difference in ease of securitization around the threshold, 
differences in the returns to screening are attenuated due to 
the presence of more hard information. Our fi ndings for full 
documentation loans suggest that the role of soft information 
is crucial to understanding what worked and what did not in 
the existing securitized subprime loan market.
Can Self-Control Explain Turning Down 
Free Money?
The third paper, co-authored with Brian C. Cadena, uses 
insights from behavioral economics to explain a particularly 
bizarre borrowing phenomenon: About one in six undergrad-
uate students who are offered interest-free loans turn them 
down. The students we observe making these choices are not 
atypical: Our sample consists of full-time students enrolled 
at public or private nonprofi t four-year institutions. Upon fi ll-
ing out the application required for all forms of need-based 
aid, these students demonstrated suffi cient fi nancial need 
to qualify for interest-free loans sponsored by the federal 
government.
There are three principal reasons we should be surprised 
that one-sixth of eligible students turn down the subsidized 
loans that they are offered. First, these loans do not accrue 
interest until six months after students leave school. These 
interest payments represent a direct transfer to the student, 
and the amount is nontrivial. If a student eligible for the 
maximum in each year chose to accept the loan each year, 
with an interest rate of four percent, the government subsidy 
would be worth more than $1,500. The “free money” aspect 
of below-market interest rates on student loans has long 
been a part of conventional economic wisdom. One classic 
undergraduate textbook explains the benefi ts of a $1,000 
interest-free loan as follows: “You could at least take the 
money and put it in a savings bank, where you will earn at 
least 4 percent per year. Each year you can draw out the $40 
interest and throw a big party. Finally . . . you can draw out 
the $1,000, plus the last year’s interest; repay the $1,000; and 
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have $40 for a last party” (Alchian and Allen 1964). We are 
unaware, however, of any work that has tried to systemati-
cally understand why students do not take advantage of this 
potential $1,500 “gift” from the government.
Seeing students turn down interest-free loans is also 
surprising because government-sponsored loans help to make 
increasingly expensive educational costs more affordable. 
During a period when the return to higher education has 
dramatically increased, the rising costs of an undergraduate 
education have far outpaced the increase in the availability 
of grants and scholarships (Avery and Hoxby 2003; Dynarski 
2002;). In the absence of these programs, students would fi nd 
it costly to borrow against their future earnings due to infor-
mational asymmetries between students and private lenders. 
The federal government has recognized this potential market 
failure and offers students grants and loans through large-
scale programs, which provided $90 billion in total aid dur-
ing the 2004–2005 school year. The Stafford Loan Program 
was originally legislated through the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 and has been awarded based on a straightforward 
needs test since 1987. By rejecting their government-spon-
sored loans, students who choose to borrow are effectively 
choosing to borrow at a signifi cantly higher cost.
Finally, student aid offers are administered under the 
presumption that students will accept all of their need-based 
aid. Students must actively reduce or reject any amount they 
do not wish to borrow. In fact, if a student has borrowed 
before, she needs to do nothing at all to receive the full 
amount of any subsidized loan awarded by her fi nancial aid 
offi ce. As other researchers have shown, there is a signifi cant 
mental barrier to making decisions which deviate from the 
default, known as “default bias” (see, for example, Choi et 
al. [2003]). In the absence of competing forces, therefore, 
students should rarely deviate from the default of accepting 
all of their need-based aid, including interest-free loans.
While the benefi ts of subsidized student loans are seem-
ingly unambiguous, borrowing does increase a student’s 
short-term liquidity. As the quotation at the beginning of 
this section suggests, interest-free loans are a double-edged 
sword in the hands of an easily tempted consumer. Despite 
the fact that these loans make it possible to smooth consump-
tion over time, having such a large amount of liquidity can 
lead to overspending, i.e., consuming more out of current 
income than an agent with perfect willpower would desire.
We formalize this argument by modeling a college student 
choosing how much to borrow while in school. We show that 
a rational agent would not turn down interest-free student 
loans because doing so requires foregoing a signifi cant gov-
ernment subsidy in addition to limiting future liquidity. We 
then discuss how rejecting the loan is consistent with models 
of self-control from the theoretical literature that allow ratio-
nal consumers to prefer a subset of choices to the complete 
set. The debt-averse behavior we observe, therefore, may 
be the optimal choice a forward-thinking student can make 
knowing that in the following period she will be tempted to 
overspend.
There are, however, alternative reasons why a potential 
borrower could make the “wrong” decision. Certainly some 
students will reject the loan because they do not understand 
how the subsidy works or do not analyze the decision closely 
enough. Students may also falsely believe that borrowing 
through student loan programs will hurt their credit score. 
In fact, each month while the student is in school the lender 
reports that the loan account is being paid as agreed, estab-
lishing a solid credit history. Apart from these information 
problems, some students may reject their loans because of 
the hassle that borrowing creates, such as having to keep 
track of the documents associated with a loan or being re-
quired to make a payment each month after graduation. Still 
others may reject the loans because they have acquired an 
antidebt ethic such that indebtedness carries a psychological 
cost. Because any of these factors can potentially explain the 
signifi cant fraction of students who turn down their interest-
free loans, we cannot simply interpret high rejection rates as 
evidence of a self-control motive.
To determine whether self-control plays an important role, 
the ideal quasi-experimental setting would fi x the benefi ts 
of borrowing while varying students’ exposure to increased 
liquidity. A feature of fi nancial aid disbursement does exactly 
this: Although the value of the subsidy is unchanged, needy 
on-campus students have their loans automatically applied to 
their educational expenses while similarly needy off-campus 
students receive a portion of their aid in cash. Comparing the 
take-up rates of these two groups provides us with a means 
to test whether self-control motives are responsible for some 
of the failure in take-up.
However, if students who reject their loans for other rea-
sons tend to live in off-campus housing, this comparison may 
incorrectly attribute differences in take-up rates to differenc-
es in liquidity. To address these selection concerns, we form 
a difference-in-differences estimator, using students whose 
liquidity is unaffected by their housing location as a coun-
terfactual. For these students, any loan funds will be applied 
directly to their tuition bill regardless of where they live. 
Importantly, each member of the counterfactual group is also 
eligible for the maximum subsidized loan. If students reject 
their loans to avoid excess liquidity, the difference between 
on- and off-campus rejection rates should be much larger for 
the group who potentially receive their loans in cash.
Our estimates from the 1999–2000 and 2003–2004 waves 
of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study support a 
self-control explanation: Students who would have received 
cash from their loans turn down the subsidized loan seven 
percentage points more frequently than similarly needy 
students who live on-campus. Importantly, there is no sig-
nifi cant difference in rejection rates across housing locations 
for students who would not receive cash regardless of where 
they live. These difference-in-differences results suggest that 
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the increased liquidity created by living off-campus leads 
students to reject their loans in higher numbers.
In further support of this hypothesis, we then isolate the 
variation in living off-campus resulting from supply con-
straints at the school level. Specifi cally, we estimate the 
effect of liquidity on take-up using the university’s dormitory 
capacity (number of beds per student) as an instrument for 
the housing location decision. To maintain the advantages 
of the difference-in-differences framework, we also instru-
ment for the interaction of location and loans in excess of 
tuition, which determines whether the loan is distributed in 
cash. This exactly identifi ed IV specifi cation (two endog-
enous regressors and two instruments) thus continues to 
compare the on/off-campus differences in take-up between 
students whose loans pay only tuition and students whose 
loans also pay room and board. In contrast to the OLS results 
that potentially suffer from endogenous selection into on- or 
off-campus housing, the IV results isolate the variation in 
housing location and exposure to liquidity that derives from 
differences in the supply of on-campus housing units. The IV 
results complement the earlier fi ndings, again demonstrating 
a differential willingness to borrow across housing locations, 
even when controlling for differences in school quality that 
are correlated with housing capacity. These sets of results are 
diffi cult to explain without self-control concerns affecting 
students’ decisions.
These fi ndings provide evidence that consumers choose 
to limit their available choices in a natural setting, i.e., one 
not generated by the researcher. While several laboratory 
and simulation studies have presented evidence consistent 
with consumers exercising self-control (for example, Ariely 
and Wertenbroch 2002), studies using data and situations not 
generated by the researcher have tended to fi nd evidence of 
consumers succumbing to the temptation of earlier consump-
tion (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006; Shapiro 2005, ). In 
addition, while most fi eld experiments are explicitly de-
signed to hold constant any differences between two choices 
except for the level of commitment, our results reveal that 
some consumers are willing to pay a substantial amount of 
money in order restrict their future decisions. These two 
features distinguish this study as particularly compelling evi-
dence for the existence and importance of time-inconsistent 
preferences.
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